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INTRODUCTION 
 Attorneys are required to know and follow a set of ethical guidelines.  While most 
recognize that they have ethical obligations to their clients, the courts, and the public in 
general, many attorneys fail to fully understand their obligation to each other.  The State 
of Illinois, like almost every other jurisdiction, requires attorneys to police their 
profession and report the misconduct of their peers.  
 Titled “Reporting Professional Misconduct,” Illinois Rule of Professional 
Conduct (“IRPC”) 8.3(a) states that “[a] lawyer possessing knowledge not otherwise 
protected as a confidence by these Rules or by law that another lawyer has committed a 
violation of Rule 8.4(a)(3) or (a)(4) shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other 
authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.”1  Rules 8.4(a)(3) and 
(a)(4), respectively, prohibit attorneys from doing the following:  “commit[ting] a 
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects” and “engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”2 
 Part I of this paper examines the history of the duty to report in Illinois and the 
agency charged with enforcing it.  Part II analyzes the status of the duty to report in 
Illinois based upon the Illinois Supreme Court’s uniquely harsh imposition of punishment 
against attorneys who breach the ethical requirement.  Part III provides a practical guide 
for navigating through the various aspects of IRPC 8.3(a).  Lastly, Part IV identifies 
resources attorneys can use to assist them in complying with the duty.  
 
                                                 
1 ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.3(a) (2002), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/il/code/ [hereinafter “IRPC”]. 
2 IRPC 8.4(a)(3), (a)(4). 
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I. BACKGROUND  
 The authority for state courts to regulate the conduct of the attorneys in their 
respective jurisdictions is well recognized through both the inherent powers doctrine and 
general constitutional language.3  Today, codes of ethics represent the main source of 
regulations governing attorneys’ conduct.4  A history of the American Bar Association’s 
(“ABA”) various attempts at creating ethical codes reveals the evolution of the duty to 
report.  
A.   History of the Duty to Report  
 In general, the first code of ethics for lawyers did not appear until the turn of the 
20th century.  In 1908, the American Bar Association adopted the Canons of Professional 
Ethics.5  Canon 29, specifically, explained that “lawyers should expose without fear or 
favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession.”6  This 
rule, however, did not require lawyers to report their colleagues.  As evidenced by the use 
of “should” rather than “shall,” the Canons merely provided a set of permissive 
guidelines lawyers were encouraged to follow. 
 The Code of Professional Responsibility replaced the Canons of Professional 
Ethics in 1969.7  Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) required lawyers to report another lawyer’s 
                                                 
3 STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 2 (7th ed. 2005). 
4 See 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 42 (2004) (“Attorneys are subject to a Code of Professional 
Responsibility, and they must adhere to the moral standards prescribed by rules of ethics.  Compliance with 
canons of professional ethics is a personal duty of each attorney.”). 
5 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908), reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, SELECTED 
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 412 (1989). 
6 CANNONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 29 (1908) 
7 See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer’s Duty to Report Another Lawyer’s Unethical Violations in the Wake 
of Himmel, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 979 (1988) (“On August 12, 1969, the American Bar Association’s 
House of Delegates adopted an entirely new code, then called the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility.”) 
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violation of any other of the disciplinary rules.8  In addition, the rule required lawyers to 
report their colleagues who tried to do any of the following:  (i) “[c]ircumvent a 
Disciplinary Rule through actions of another”; (ii) “[e]ngage in illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude”; (iii) “[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation”; (iv) “[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice”; (v) “engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on [the attorney’s] 
fitness to practice law.”9  Unlike the permissive Canons, DR 1-103(A) was designed as a 
mandatory reporting requirement for attorneys.10  As a practical matter, however, DR 1-
103(A)’s breadth made it unenforceable. 
 In 1983, the ABA adopted its third version of ethical rules – the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.11  In an effort to increase its enforceability, the ABA significantly 
narrowed the reporting requirement in its latest version.12  According to Model Rule 
8.3(a), “[a] lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s 
honest, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the 
appropriate professional authority.”13  Although narrower than its predecessor, Rule 
8.3(a) still covers a variety of circumstances under which attorneys must report the 
actions of their peers. 
                                                 
8 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-103(A) (1980). 
9 Id. 
10 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (“The Disciplinary rules state 
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary 
action.”) 
11 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Chair’s Introduction (1998) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
12 Cynthia L. Gendry, Comment, Ethics – An Attorney’s Duty to Report the Professional Misconduct of Co-
Workers, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 603, 605 (1994). 
13 MODEL RULE 8.3(a). 
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 The ABA’s Rules of Professional Conduct are called “Model Rules” for a reason: 
Legally speaking, the ABA is simply a trade organization and does not possess the 
authority to promulgate binding regulations.14  They remain important, however, because 
most state courts use the ABA’s rules for guidance when adopting their own disciplinary 
rules.15  Indeed, the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct – which are binding on Illinois 
attorneys -- contains a similar Rule 8.3(a) mandatory reporting requirement.16   
B. The Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission 
 While the Illinois Supreme Court possesses the ultimate authority to both generate 
rules of professional conduct and enforce those rules against the bar,17 various aspects of 
that authority have been delegated to other agencies.  Specifically, the Attorney 
Registration & Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois (“ARDC”) 
receives, investigates, and prosecutes reports of attorney violations of the Illinois Rules of 
Professional Conduct.18  The ARDC comprises seven Commissioners – four lawyers and 
three non-lawyers – who act as the Commission’s board of directors and appoint an 
Administrator and a Hearing Board.19  It is the Administrator and the Administrator’s 
staff who are in charge of conducting investigations and filing formal charges against 
attorneys who engage in unethical conduct.20  Formal charges then proceed before the 
Hearing Board – who receive evidence, make factual determinations, and recommend 
discipline.21 
                                                 
14 W. BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2d. ed. 2007). 
15 Id. 
16 See Part III.A, infra, for an analysis of the differences between Model Rule 8.3(a) and IRPC 8.3(a).  
17 See In re Ettinger, 128 Ill. 2d 351, 365 (Ill. 1989) (explaining that the Illinois Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction to regulate the admission and discipline of lawyers in Illinois). 
18 See, Skolnick v. Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 218 (Ill. 2000) (citing 134 Ill. 2d R. 751, et seq). 
19 ARDC Overview, http://www.iardc.org/overview.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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 Both the Administrator and disciplined attorneys can appeal to the Review Board, 
whose nine lawyer members are appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court.22  Ultimately, 
the Illinois Supreme Court retains the right to fully hear the case and either (i) enter its 
own final order or (ii) sign off on the discipline recommended by either the Hearing or 
Review Board.23  This brief overview illustrates how all disciplinary rules – including the 
duty to report – are generated and enforced in Illinois.  Understanding the requirements 
of the duty to report, therefore, requires an examination of how both the ARDC and the 
Illinois Supreme Court apply the rule in practice.                     
C.  The Importance of the Duty to Report in the Legal Profession 
 Before analyzing the enforcement of the duty to report, it is important to 
understand its purpose.  Why require attorneys to report the misconduct of their peers?  
The medical profession, for example, has no similar reporting requirement.  In fact, 
doctors follow a generally recognized code of silence – an implicit regulation against 
reporting other doctors’ misconduct.24  In the legal profession, however, reporting is not 
only encouraged, it is mandated. 
 All of the underlying rationales for the duty to report essentially fall into two 
categories:  (i) the duty to report protects the public from attorneys, and (ii) the duty to 
report protects attorneys from the public.  The first is the most obvious: Unethical 
attorneys can cause severe damage to their clients and the public as a whole.  Converting 
funds, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation all represent harms that lawyers – in whom 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  Reprimand, whether public or private, is the most basic form of discipline and can be ordered by the 
Hearing Board or the Review Board.  Id.  More serious forms of discipline, however, must be ordered by 
the Illinois Supreme Court and include: (i) disbarment, (ii) suspension; (iii) probation, and (iv) censure.  Id. 
24 See, Charles B. Plattsmier, Self Regulation and the Duty to Report Misconduct: Myth of Mainstay?, THE 
PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUE, May-June 2007, at 41 (“In the medical profession, the so called ‘conspiracy of 
silence’ has become almost accepted as a deeply ingrained part of the fraternity of doctors and other health 
care providers.”).  
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clients place their trust and confidence – are in a unique position to inflict.   Indeed, one 
of the aims of attorney discipline in general is to protect the public from unscrupulous 
attorneys.25  As one commentator notes, the duty to report and attorney discipline are 
“inherently connected” because “[b]efore an attorney who acts unethically can be 
disciplined, his actions must be reported.”26  Attorneys are ultimately best suited to 
perform this initial reporting function because, as empirical evidence demonstrates, their 
reports are both more accurate and effective.27  The duty to report, therefore, plays an 
important part in weeding out unethical attorneys and protecting the general public. 
 By weeding out unethical attorneys, the duty to report also protects attorneys from 
a negative public perception.  As recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court, one of the 
purposes behind the duty to report is guarding the integrity of the legal profession.28  
Another commentator further explains that “the message of the reporting requirement is 
that the integrity of the legal profession must be protected, even at the expense of zealous 
advocacy, and the lawyer’s own interests.”29  A lack of public faith in the integrity of the 
legal profession could lead to the demolition of the legal profession’s current self-
                                                 
25 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, reprinted in 
ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.1, § 01:807 cmt. (1992) (listing the 
objectives of lawyer sanctions in general: (i) protecting public, (ii) protecting integrity of legal system, (iii) 
administering justice, and (iv) preventing unethical behavior).  
26 Gendry, supra note 12, at 605. 
27 See Thomas P. Sukowicz, The Himmel Duty: Observations by an ADRC Lawyer, CHI. B. ASS’N REC., 
Nov. 1997, at 17.  Sukowicz notes that in 1996, 19% of the Illinois ARDC’s formal charges were the result 
of reports filed by other attorneys.  Id.  This, combined with the fact that reports filed by attorneys 
accounted for less than 8% of the total number of reports filed that year, reveal that attorney reporting 
resulted in “one-fifth of the formal charges filed against attorneys and for a much smaller percentage of 
matters that did not warrant formal disciplinary action.”  Id.   
28 See Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 226, 730 (noting that the duty to report “and the certain discipline that flows 
from a breach of that duty, is animated by a desire to: maintain the integrity of the legal profession”); See 
also, IRPC, Preamble (explaining that the duty to report “misconduct can be a formidable deterrent to such 
misconduct, and a key to maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the profession as a whole in the 
face of the egregious misconduct of a few”). 
29 David C. Olsson, Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service to Ethical Standards Is Not Enough, 31 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 657, 659-60 (1989). 
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regulation process.30  The power public outcry can have on elected officials should not be 
underestimated.  One author argues that the duty to report is an important weapon in 
forming a defense against “the improper and truly frightening specter of political 
intervention in disciplinary regulation.”31  The message is clear: If lawyers don’t police 
themselves, someone else will.    
II.   ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY TO REPORT IN ILLINOIS 
 The above section demonstrates the importance of a reporting requirement; 
however, simply establishing a reporting rule does not automatically result in attorneys 
complying with it.  Compliance with the duty to report requires enforcement.32  
 Although almost every jurisdiction has adopted some form of the duty to report,33 
the enforcement of that duty varies widely.  In Minnesota, for example, the duty to report 
exists, but it is simply never enforced.34  Similarly, Georgia’s version of Rule 8.3(a) 
contains only permissive language (i.e. “should”) and further explains that “there is no 
                                                 
30 See In re Riehlmann, 891 So.2d 1239, 1249 (La. 2005).  In analyzing its own duty to report, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court succinctly explained: 
[T]the lawyer’s duty to report professional misconduct is the foundation for the claim that 
we can be trusted to regulate ourselves as a profession.  If we fail in our duty, we forfeit 
that trust and have no right to enjoy the privilege of self-regulation or the confidence and 
respect of the public. 
Id. 
31 Plattsmier, supra note 24, at 44.  Plattsmier further argues that weeding out incompetent, unethical 
lawyers is beneficial to attorneys for much more selfish reasons. Id.  Incompetent attorneys damage other 
attorneys when their conduct results in (i) commingling of funds, which triggers reimbursement from 
attorney funded programs for client protection and (ii) ineffective assistance of counsel, which results in a 
new trial and further clogs the court system.  Id.   
32 See Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3:  How Is It Used and What 
Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 757-58 (2003) (arguing that self-regulation 
does not occur unless combined with court enforcement). 
33 Id. at 755 (citing Kentucky and California as the only jurisdictions without a comparable reporting 
obligation as of 2003).  
34 Mary L. Galvin, A Lawyers’ Duty to Report Misconduct Under 8.3, MINN. LAW., Dec. 3, 2001, available 
at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/lprb/fc120301.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). 
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disciplinary penalty for violation of this Rule.”35  The majority of jurisdictions, however, 
fall into the following category:  The duty to report is only enforced in conjunction with 
at least one other ethical violation.36  Illinois fell into this final category until 1988 – 
when the Illinois Supreme Court strictly enforced its version of the duty to report. 
A.   In re Himmel: Illinois' Uniquely Strict Enforcement of the Duty to Report  
 In In re Himmel,37 the Illinois Supreme Court – for the first time – examined 
whether an attorney should be punished solely for his failure to comply with the duty to 
report.38  By answering the issue in the affirmative and suspending the attorney’s law 
license for a year, the court sent a strong message to the Illinois legal community:  The 
duty to report will be strictly enforced.    
 1.   The Facts and Holding of the Case   
 The case involved attorney James H. Himmel; his client (“the client”); and his 
client’s former attorney, John R. Casey (“Casey”).  After the client was injured in a 
motorcycle accident, Casey negotiated a $35,000 settlement.39  The client, however, 
never received her share of the settlement agreement because Casey converted it for his 
own use.40  So she hired Himmel to collect her settlement from Casey, agreeing to pay 
Himmel one-third of any funds he recovered above her original share – which was 
$23,2333,34.41 
                                                 
35GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.3, available at 
http://www.gabar.org/handbook/part_iv_after_january_1_2001_-_georgia_rules_of_professional_conduct/ 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2008). 
36 Ott & Newton, supra note 32, at 757. 
37 125 Ill. 2d 531 (Ill. 1988) 
38 The case dealt with Rule 8.3’s predecessor: Rule 1-103(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  
The text of the rules are substantially similar.  However, see Part III.C, infra, for a discussion about how 
the language in IRPC 8.3(a) narrowed Rule 1-103(a)’s privilege exception. 
39125 Ill. 2d at 535   
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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 Himmel discovered Casey’s improper conduct and negotiated a settlement 
agreement between Casey and the client.42  The terms of the agreement stated that in 
exchange for $75,000, the client would not initiate any criminal, civil, or attorney 
disciplinary action against Casey.43  Although the agreement said nothing about Himmel 
reporting Casey’s conduct to the ARDC, the client specifically asked him not to take such 
action.44  When Casey breached this settlement agreement, Himmel filed suit to enforce 
the agreement and received a $100,000 judgment against Casey.45  The client ultimately 
collected $10,000 from Casey.46  Himmel took no fee.47 
 After discovering Casey’s actions and disbarring him for commingling client 
funds, the ARDC initiated disciplinary proceedings against Himmel for his failure to 
report Casey’s conduct.48  Finding Himmel in violation, the Hearing Board recommended 
a private reprimand.49 
 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court not only agreed with the Hearing Board’s 
finding, but increased Himmel’s punishment to a one year suspension.50  In its decision, 
the supreme court addressed three main issues.  First, the court gave no weight to the fact 
that the client specifically directed him not to report Casey.51  Second, the court held that 
attorney-client privilege did not prevent Himmel from reporting because the client 
waived the privilege when she discussed Casey’s actions in the presence of third 
                                                 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 536 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 536-37 
47 Id. at 537 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 546 
51 Id. at 539 (“A lawyer may not choose to circumvent the rules by simply asserting that his client asked 
him to do so.”). 
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parties.52  Third, the court determined that a harsher punishment was necessary to serve 
the purpose of attorney discipline:  “maintaining the integrity of the legal profession and 
safeguarding the administration of justice.”53    
   2.   Himmel’s Impact on the Legal Community 
 The outcome in Himmel sent shockwaves through the legal community.54  The 
case represents the first time that any jurisdiction sanctioned a lawyer solely for violating 
the duty to report.  In 1989, the year after the Himmel decision, the number of attorney 
misconduct reports filed by Illinois attorneys increased from 154 instances to 922 
instances.55   
 Since Himmel, there have been no other reported cases of Illinois attorneys 
sanctioned solely for violating the duty to report.  Data reveals, however, that the number 
of reports Illinois attorneys file with the ARDC has remained relatively constant since 
1992 – despite the fact that the decision occurred twenty years ago.56  Attorney 
compliance with the duty to report in Illinois continues to substantially surpass all other 
jurisdictions.57  Further, as one author notes, the Himmel case continues to “engender so 
much fretting and confusion on the part of Illinois lawyers that [the] ARDC has included 
                                                 
52 Id at 541-42.  
53 Id. at 543. 
54 See, Rotunda, supra note 7, at 991 (“Himmel was a dramatic surprise to the bar.”).  To say that the 
decision has provided fodder for legal academics is an understatement.  An April 2008 LexisNexis citator 
report identified 108 law review articles citing to the decision.    
55 See Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct:  A Practical Analysis of 
Lawyer Self-regulation, 12 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 182 (1999) (“In the first year after Himmel was 
decided, Illinois attorneys’ reports of professional misconduct increased by 500%.”). 
56 Mary T. Robinson, A Lawyer’s Duty to Report Another Lawyer’s Misconduct:  The Illinois Experience, 
THE PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUE, May-June 2007, at 47, 54.  Robinson charts, among other things, the number 
of ARDC investigations and the number of attorney reports with the ARDC from 1992 to 2006.  Id.  In 
1992, the number of attorney reports was 554. Id.  In 2006, the number was 435. Id.  Over that time span, 
the number of attorney reports broke the 500 report barrier eleven times and dropped below 400 only twice.  
Id.    
57 Richmond, supra note 55, at 182 (“Illinois attorneys now report misconduct at a rate unmatched by any 
other state.”) 
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it in an ethics FAQ at http://www.iardc.org/ethics_faq.html.”58  An analysis of the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the duty to report in other contexts reveals the explanation 
for this continued concern.     
B.   Skolnick v. Gray:  A Reminder that the Duty to Report in Illinois Is Absolute   
 Despite the fact that no other Illinois attorney has been sanctioned solely for 
violating the duty to report, the concern surrounding Himmel has not dissipated over the 
past twenty years.  This is due, in part, to the Illinois Supreme Court’s commitment to 
strictly applying the duty to report.  In Skolnick v. Gray,59 for example, the Illinois 
Supreme Court forced a trial court to modify a protective order so that one of the 
attorney’s involved in the proceeding could comply with the duty to report.60    
 The case surrounded Kenneth Skolnick – a partner in a large law firm.  The firm 
suspected Skolnick of filing a forged document with the court and reported this alleged 
misconduct.61  The ARDC subsequently initiated an investigation, but the Commission 
ultimately dropped the complaint due to a lack of evidence.62  Skolnick then sued the 
firm, alleging that the firm’s accusations that he forged the document were defamatory 
and tortiously interfered with his business relations.63  Given the nature of the claim, the 
trial court ordered a protective order, which it applied to all information supplied during 
the discovery process.64  During this process, however, Terry Kass, one of the attorneys 
for the firm, discovered a document which indicated that Skolnick had engaged in 
                                                 
58Helen W. Gunnarsson, What’s Your Duty Under Himmel?, ILL. B.J., June 2007, at 296, 297.  
59 191 Ill. 2d 214 (Ill. 2000). 
60 Id. at 226. 
61 Id. at 217. 
62 Id.at 218. 
63 Id.   
64 Id. at 218-19 
 13
unrelated, improper conduct.65  She requested that the trial court modify the protective 
order so she could report the alleged misconduct.66  Her argument was simple:  The 
contents of the document triggered her duty to report, and since the duty to report is 
absolute, she must be allowed to notify the ARDC.67   
 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with Kass.  The court began its decision by 
reaffirming that the duty to report is absolute.68  Given this fact, the court further 
explained that “only the weightiest considerations of justice could excuse a trial court’s 
refusal to modify a protective order so that counsel could fulfill [her] absolute, ethical 
duty.”69  Skolnick argued that Kass could satisfy her duty by simply reporting the 
conduct to the trial court – an act that would not require modification of the protective 
order.70  In rejecting this argument, the court engaged in a three step analysis.  First, only 
the Illinois Supreme Court has the inherent power to discipline attorneys.71  Second, 
similar to most jurisdictions, the supreme court delegated the investigative and 
prosecutorial aspects of that authority to the ARDC.72  The duty to report, therefore, is 
only satisfied when attorneys alert the entity with whom the investigative authority rests 
– the ARDC.73 
 Skolnick sent two messages to the legal community.  First, the court renewed its 
commitment to enforcing the duty to report by asserting that the duty is absolute.  
Second, the court clarified that the rule requires attorneys to report to the ARDC.  In 
                                                 
65 Id. at 219 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 216 
69 Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
70 Id. at 223. 
71 Id. at 229. 
72 Id.;. See, supra Part I.B.  
73 Id. 
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other words, reporting misconduct to a senior partner in a law firm or even a trial court 
judge does not discharge the attorney’s obligation. 
C.  Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga: A Refusal to Protect Associates from Retaliation 
 The holdings of Himmel and Skolnick alone do not justify attorneys’ concern with 
the duty to report.  After all, as a mandatory guideline, IRPC 8.3(a) only establishes when 
attorneys must report their colleagues.  Provided they are not violating a client’s 
confidence, however, attorneys face no restriction on what they may report.  The solution 
to curing Himmel anxiety seems clear: To avoid a Himmel fate, attorneys in Illinois 
should report all suspicious conduct.   
 This advice, however, oversimplifies the situation and fails to account for 
practical considerations attorneys face – especially newer attorneys in large firms.  
Attorneys prefer not to report their colleagues for several reasons.  First, there is the 
general reluctance of reporting and being labeled a “tattletale” or “snitch.”74  Second, the 
duty to report does not discriminate between friends and enemies or co-workers and 
opponents.  Feelings of loyalty may prevent attorneys who work together from reporting 
each other’s misconduct.75  Finally, attorneys fear retaliation. 
 There are two ways retaliation may be an issue.  First, the party who was reported 
may file lawsuits against the reporting attorney for libel or slander.  In general, this 
should not concern attorneys too greatly because Illinois Supreme Court Rule 775 grants 
attorneys reporting to the ARDC immunity from any civil liability.76  Note, however, that 
                                                 
74 See Julie L. Hussey, Reporting Another Attorney for Violating the Rules of Professional Conduct:  The 
Current Status of the Law in the States Which Have Adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 23 
J. LEGAL PROF. 265, 265 (1998-99) (identifying the unpleasantness associated with the role of reporting 
other attorneys). 
75 See Gendry, supra note 12, at 605. 
76 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 775, available at: http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/Art_VII/default.asp.  
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the rules protection extends only to those communications made to the ARDC.77  In 
Skolnick, for example, the firm not only reported Skolnick’s conduct to the ARDC, but 
they also made public comments about their belief that he created the forged document.78  
These outside statements formed the basis of the lawsuit. 
 The second type of retaliation attorneys fear is adverse employment actions form 
their employer-firms.  This reporting consequence is of specific concern to newer 
attorneys in large firms and best demonstrated by a hypothetical.  Imagine that you are a 
young attorney, recently hired by a Chicago law firm.  Shortly after starting, you discover 
that the firm is filing consumer debt collection actions that violate the venue provisions of 
several consumer collection protection statutes.  Concerned with the legality of this 
practice, you alert one of your firm’s principal partners.  He thanks you and assures you 
the matter will be handled.  A year later, however, you discover the matter was not 
handled and the firm continues to violate the consumer protection statutes.79  You take 
the matter before the partner for a second time and again nothing changes.  Two weeks 
after vocalizing your concerns for a third time, the firm’s decision makers finally take 
action:  They terminate your employment.  
 The above hypothetical mirrors the facts of Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga.80  The 
fired associate, Jacobson, filed suit against his former firm under a theory of retaliatory 
discharge.81  The issue analyzed by the appellate court was whether Illinois precedent 
precluded an attorney “from maintaining a cause of action for the Tort of Retaliatory 
                                                 
77 Id. (“The grant of immunity provided by this rule shall apply only to those communications made by 
such persons to the [ARDC], its administrators, staff, investigators and members of its boards.”) 
78 191 Ill. 2d at 218.  In his nine-count complaint, Skolnick alleged that the firm accused him of the 
unethical conduct in front of other attorneys within the firm and other clients of the firm.  Id.  
79 You know this to be a fact because the firm actually gave you the responsibility of reviewing and signing 
all the firm’s consumer debt collection complaints. 
80 185 Ill. 2d 372 (Ill. 1998) 
81 Id. at 374. 
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Discharge against his . . . law firm employer due to the pre-eminence of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”82  Put another way, does an attorney have a cause of action 
against his employer when he is fired for attempting to comply with the mandatory duty 
to report?  The appellate court found that such a cause of action exists and that the 
lawsuit should continue.83   
 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate court and ordered the 
trial court to dismiss the case.84  The court began its opinion by broadening the issue to 
whether “an attorney who has been discharged by his law firm employer should be 
allowed the remedy of an action for retaliatory discharge.”85  To satisfy Illinois’ 
requirements for a retaliatory discharge action, Jacobson had to establish two elements: 
(1) “he was discharged in retaliation for his actions,” and (2) “the discharge was in 
contravention of a clearly mandated public policy.”86  Even assuming Jacobson could 
satisfy the first element, the court determined he failed under the second because the 
public’s interests were already adequately protected without extending the tort of 
retaliatory discharge.87  In order to follow the court’s logic, it is important to understand 
that the court concerned itself with the public policy behind the collection protection 
statutes the firm was allegedly violating – not the public policy behind the IRPC.  
Jacobson argued that allowing firms to terminate attorneys for reporting this kind of 
violation would have a chilling effect on other attorneys – discouraging them from 
reporting similar violations by their firms for fear of retaliation.88  This situation risks 
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84 Id. at 378 
85 Id. at 374. 
86 Id. at 376. 
87 Id. at 377-78 
88 Id. at 376. 
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significantly reducing compliance with the collection statutes and ultimately jeopardizing 
the public policy behind them:  protecting consumer debtors’ property and ensuring the 
debtors due process.89  According to Jacobson, therefore, providing unfairly punished 
attorneys relief against their former firms through the tort of retaliatory discharge is 
necessary to adequately protect the collection statutes’ underlying public policy.     
 The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.  In fact, the court used IRPC 8.3(a)’s duty 
to report as support for its conclusion that the underlying policy behind the collection 
statutes was already adequately protected.90  Under IRPC 8.3(a), attorneys are required to 
report the type of conduct in which Jacobson’s former firm engaged – whether or not 
they fear retaliation from the firm.  According to the court, therefore, the mandatory 
ethical obligation to report, by itself, adequately protects the underlying public policy 
behind the collection statutes.91  Since the public policy is already sufficiently protected, 
the court concluded, expanding the tort of retaliatory discharge to Jacobson’s situation is 
unnecessary and improper.92  Case dismissed. 
D.   Report or Not Report?  An Illinois Attorney’s Catch-22  
 From a purely theoretical standpoint, the court’s reasoning in Jacobson is likely 
correct.  One of the decision’s pitfalls, however, is that the court failed to consider the 
practical effect such a result has on attorneys’ likelihood to comply with the duty to 
report.  On the one hand, the Illinois Supreme Court, through Himmel and Skolnick, 
consistently emphasizes the importance of following the duty to report.  On the other, in 
Jacobson, the court fails to protect attorneys who attempt to comply with the requirement 
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and subsequently lose their jobs.  In his dissenting opinion in Jacobson, Chief Justice 
Freemen identified that the majority’s holding “serves as yet another reminder to the 
attorneys in [Illinois] that, in certain circumstances, it is economically more advantageous 
to keep quiet than to follow the dictates of the Rules of Professional Responsibility.”93 
 Collectively, the above three cases illustrate a true dilemma facing new attorneys 
in Illinois:  report and risk professional ruin, or keep quiet and risk sanctions.  Some 
commentators believe this dilemma illustrates the absurdity of extending Rule 8.3(a) to 
cover intra-firm reporting.  One author, for example, argues that  when faced with a 
situation like the one in Jacobson “almost every lawyer will [not report and] gamble (1) 
that his failure to report will never be discovered and (2) that he can avoid or mitigate any 
sanction for not reporting the misconduct.”94  These commentators agree that either the 
court should protect complying attorneys who suffer retaliation, or the rule should be 
modified to exclude intra-firm reporting.95 
 While an analysis of whether the court should revisit the holding in Jacobson or 
amend the text of IRPC 8.3(a) is beyond the scope of this paper, the points discussed 
above demonstrate that Illinois attorneys face potentially competing interests in deciding 
whether to report another attorney’s conduct.  In reaching an ultimate decision, it is 
important for attorneys to be well-informed as to (i) the various requirements of IRPC 
8.3(a) and (ii) the various resources available to assist them in their decision. 
 
 
                                                 
93 Jacobson, 185 Ill. 2d at 378 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
94 Richmond, supra note 55, at 203. 
95 Id.; See also, Ott & Newton, supra note 32, at 766 (“If more states . . . provided some basic remedy for 
attorneys who are terminated for following the mandates of Model Rule 8.3 and its state analogues, 
attorney reporting might improve.”). 
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III. A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NAVIGATING IRPC 8.3 
 An analysis of IRPC 8.3(a)’s requirements begins with an examination of its text.  
Titled “Reporting Professional Misconduct,” Rule 8.3(a) states that “[a] lawyer 
possessing knowledge not otherwise protected as a confidence by these Rules or by law 
that another lawyer has committed a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(3) or (a)(4) shall report such 
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such 
violation.”96  Rules 8.4(a)(3) and (a)(4), respectively, prohibit attorneys from doing the 
following:  “commit[ting] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects” and “engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”97 
 Understanding the specificities of IRPC 8.3(a), like any exercise in statutory 
interpretation, requires analyzing the language used in the rule.  This analysis, however, 
can lead to more questions than answers – specifically: (i) what kind of misconduct is 
covered; (ii) when does an attorney have “knowledge” of this misconduct; (iii) when is 
that knowledge protected as a confidence or by law; and (iv) to whom should the attorney 
report?  Further, as demonstrated by the outcome in Jacobson, knowing when not to 
report can be just as important as knowing when to report.      
A.  What Kind of Misconduct Is Covered? 
 Compared to other jurisdictions, the definition of reportable conduct in the Illinois 
version of the duty to report is actually more limited and precise.98  Under the ABA’s 
                                                 
96 IRPC 8.3(a)  
97 IRPC 8.4(a)(3), (a)(4). 
98 See Robinson, supra note 56, at 49.  Robinson notes that the Illinois State Bar Association and the 
Chicago Bar Association formed a joint committee to analyze the ABA’s changes to the Model Rules in 
2000.  Id.  The committee’s report urged the Illinois Supreme Court to maintain IRPC 8.3(a)’s “more 
precise and limited” language in identifying what types of conduct must be reported.  Id. (citing Joint 
ISBA/CBA Committee on Ethics 2000 Final Report (October 17, 2003) at p. 38). 
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Model Rule 8.3(a), for example, attorneys are required to report conduct that “raises a 
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects.”99  IRPC 8.3(a) provides more specific guidance by separating misconduct 
into two categories: (i) civil conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation and (ii) criminal conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.100  
 To better understand the first category, recognize that the Illinois Rules define 
“fraud” as “conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent 
misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.”101  This relatively 
narrow definition removes certain conduct from the reporting requirement.  General acts 
of negligence, for example, are not the type of conduct for which attorneys must report 
their colleagues.102  Other conduct that, although prohibited elsewhere in the Illinois 
Rules, does not contain the requisite element of dishonesty and are therefore removed 
from IRPC 8.3’s scope include: attorneys who fail to identify conflicts of interest; 
attorneys who communicate with parties represented by counsel; attorneys who ignore 
advertising restrictions; and attorneys who fail to consistently communicate with their 
clients.103  ARDC Administrative Counsel Mary Andreoni further explains that an 
attorney’s “knowledge of his friend’s failure to make a Himmel report is not the kind of 
offense he must report.”104     
                                                 
99 MODEL RULE 8.3 
100 IRPC 8.3(a). 
101 IRPC, Terminology. 
102 Sukowicz, supra note 27, at 17. 
103 Id. 
104 Mary Andreoni, Ten Ethics Questions From Young Lawyers, , CHI. B. ASS’N REC., Mar. 1998, available 
at: http://www.iardc.org/article_tenethicsquestions.html#6.  
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 Although the IRPC contain a precise definition of “fraud”, the Illinois Supreme 
Court has applied the definition to a much broader range of conduct.105  Former Senior 
Counsel for the ARDC, Thomas P. Sukowicz, identifies the following conduct as falling 
in this broader range: converting client funds; suppressing evidence; creating evidence; 
and engaging in deception or fraud in connection with business transactions.106  He also 
notes that certain material misrepresentations – such as those made to clients in an effort 
to conceal misconduct; those made to opposing counsel during litigation; and those made 
to the court are tribunal – are covered by Rule 8.4(a)(4) and should be reported.107 
 The second category of reportable misconduct covers attorneys’ criminal acts.  
The Illinois Supreme Court has established that in disciplining attorneys, “[i]t is not the 
conviction of a crime which justifies discipline, but the commission of the [underlying] 
act.”108  This suggests that attorneys have a duty to report another attorney’s criminal 
conduct – even though the attorney has not been convicted or even prosecuted for that 
conduct.109  
 IRPC 8.4(a)(3), however, does not encompass all criminal conduct and is limited 
to that conduct which “reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”110  Sukowicz notes that this definition clearly 
covers theft, criminal fraud, drug dealing, obstruction of justice, bribery, and perjury.111  
                                                 
105 Se In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 421 (Ill. 1987) (holding that fraud “includes anything calculated to 
deceive, including suppression of truth and the suggestion of what is false.”); In re Armentrout, 99 Ill. 2d 
242, 245(Ill. 1983) (determining that the dishonest conduct proscribed by Rule 8.4(a)(4) could arise by 
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106 Sukowicz, supra note 27, at 17. 
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108 In re Rolley, 121 Ill. 2d 222, 232 (Ill. 1988). 
109See Michael L. Shakman et al., Reporting Your Partners and Associates to the ARDC, 90 ILL. BAR J. 143 
(Mar. 2002) 
110 IRPC 8.4(a)(3) 
111 Sukowicz, supra note 27, at 17. 
 22
Indeed, in In re Arnold112 – one of the few post-Himmel cases involving an Illinois 
lawyer disciplined for violating the duty to report – a lawyer was disciplined for, among 
other things, failing to report a local judge whom the lawyer knew was growing 
marijuana.113  The lawyer later admitted that he didn’t report the judge because the 
lawyer didn’t want to lose his source for marijuana.114 
 While the conduct listed above illustrates obviously reportable crimes, analyzing 
conduct that lies at the margin is much more difficult.  In one article, the authors cite 
authority that cocaine possession and driving under the influence are forms of criminal 
conduct prohibited under Rule 8.4(a)(3).115  This fact, combined with the lack of a 
conviction requirement, leads to an alarming result for newer attorneys.  One can imagine 
a situation where an attorney watches a senior partner drive home from a firm social 
function after – in the attorney’s mind – drinking a few too many martinis.  Does IRPC 
8.3(a) really require the attorney to report this conduct to the ARDC?  The previously 
mentioned authors say that, according to the strict text of the Rule, it does.116  It should be 
noted, however, that no cases exist where an attorney was punished for failing to report 
such conduct.  Further, the hypothetical appears to describe the type of “de minimis” 
violations excluded by the Rule.117    
 A variation on the above hypothetical does present a situation where attorneys 
should consider reporting to the ARDC – even if they are not required to under the rule.  
If, for example, an attorney recognizes that a colleague is dealing with a substance abuse 
                                                 
112 93 SH 436, M.R. 10462 (1994) 
113 Details of the case are described by former ADRC Administrator Mary T. Robinson.  See Robinson, 
supra note 56, at 51. 
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115 See Shakman et al.., supra note 109. 
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issue, then that attorney may be doing the colleague a favor by reporting.  As former 
ARDC Administrator Mary Robinson explains, “There are a number of lawyers who go 
into treatment only because they hit the brick wall [attorneys] call the ARDC.”118      
 Unfortunately for the inquiring attorney, the conduct listed in the paragraphs 
above is not exhaustive.  IRPC 8.3(a), while drafted more narrowly than other 
jurisdictions’, still forces attorneys to analyze each instance on a case-by-case basis.  In 
ultimately deciding whether particular conduct is covered, attorneys should remember 
that the duty to report is designed to identify serious misconduct.  Deputy Administrator 
and Chief Counsel James Grogan clarifies that “De minimis violations need not be 
reported.”119  He further cautions that when determining whether misconduct is covered 
as either fraudulent or criminal, attorneys should remember that, “[a]ll rules must be 
interpreted with common sense as the guide.”120           
B.  When Does an Attorney Have “Knowledge” of Misconduct? 
 Identifying whether an attorney has sufficient “knowledge” of another attorney’s 
misconduct is perhaps the murkiest aspect of IRPC 8.3.  The Illinois Rules state that the 
term “knows” means “actual knowledge of the fact in question.”121  The definition further 
provides that “[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”122  
According to this definition, Sukowicz concludes that “[w]hile direct observation by the 
lawyer may not be required to constitute actual knowledge, it is safe to say that 
information based on hearsay or rumor need not be reported.”123  
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 The accuracy of this statement, however, depends on whether the Illinois 
Supreme Court has subsequently modified the knowledge definition.  Referring back to 
Skolnick, the defense argued that Kass, the attorney requesting the modification to the 
protective order, did not possess sufficient “knowledge” of any alleged unethical conduct 
because she was not “absolute[ly] certain.”124  In rejecting this argument, the court noted 
that the Illinois knowledge requirement was similar to the knowledge requirement under 
the ABA’s Model Rules – which define knowledge as “more than a mere suspicion” but 
less than “absolute certainty.”125     
 Commentators disagree on the effect of this language.  At one end, the court may 
have eliminated the “actual knowledge” requirement and replaced it with the more liberal 
“more than a mere suspicion” standard.126  This broader standard likely encompasses 
knowledge that is based entirely on hearsay statements.127  At the other end, the court 
may have simply used the ABA definition of actual knowledge to reject any suggestion 
that an attorney must be absolutely certain.128  Supporters of this position argue that 
knowledge should only be based on facts that would be admissible in evidence.129 
 The proper standard likely falls somewhere in the middle of these competing 
extremes.  Rather than searching for a brightline standard, attorneys should approach the 
issue from a more objective standpoint and ask themselves the following question:  
Would this information cause a reasonable attorney to take action?  Robinson notes that 
the answer to this inquiry often requires an attorney to analyze the source of the 
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information.130  General complaints from a biased observer alone likely lack the 
credibility needed to trigger the rule.131  At the same time, information from a reliable, 
unbiased source alone may be enough to satisfy the knowledge requirement.132   
 The struggle to determine when an attorney has “knowledge” is not unique to 
Illinois.  In Attorney U v. the Mississippi Bar,133 the Mississippi Supreme Court tried to 
use the case to “define the point at which a member of the bar has sufficient knowledge 
[of another attorney’s improper conduct] to be compelled to report that knowledge.”134  
The outcome resulted in a majority opinion, three dissenting opinions, and two dissenting 
and concurring opinions.  
 The facts of the case vaguely resemble the circumstances in Himmel.  Attorney S 
and a testing lab, which performed testing services for S’s clients, disagreed on their 
financial arrangement.135  They each subsequently hired separate counsel to handle the 
dispute.136   The testing lab hired Attorney U and told him that the original arrangement 
between the lab and S included a fee-splitting provision – an arrangement Attorney U 
knew violated Mississippi’s Rules of Professional Conduct.137  Without admitting or 
denying that such arrangement existed, attorney S disclaimed the arrangement and settled 
the dispute.138  When attorney U was subsequently found in violation of Mississippi’s 
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duty to report, he appealed and argued that he did not have sufficient “knowledge” of 
attorney S’s improper conduct.139 
 The majority opinion analyzed the “knowledge” standard in a variety of different 
jurisdictions.140  Eventually settling on an “actual knowledge” standard, the court refused 
to consider the attorney’s subjective beliefs in the analysis – focusing instead on whether 
the supporting evidence would cause a reasonable attorney to form a “firm opinion” that 
the unethical conduct “more likely than not occurred.”141  Despite the fact that attorney 
U’s client told him the conduct occurred, the court found he did not have sufficient 
“knowledge” because no corroboration of either the client’s story or the client’s 
trustworthiness existed.142  In applying its knowledge standard, the majority conveniently 
ignored the fact that when confronted with allegations of his misconduct, attorney S 
neither confirmed nor denied them and quickly settled the case.  The dissent emphasized 
this point and other factual discrepancies that they believed demonstrated attorney U’s 
knowledge of the improper fee-sharing arrangement.143  The discussion above 
demonstrates that the knowledge standard is far from well settled in Illinois and, even if it 
were, there is still room for judges to disagree on its application.    
C.  When Is an Attorney’s Knowledge Protected as a Confidence or by Law? 
 Assuming that an attorney has sufficient information of misconduct that is 
prohibited by Rule 8.4(a)(3) or (a)(4), that attorney is excused from reporting if the 
information is privileged from disclosure.  The language of Rule 8.3(a) states that 
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attorneys must only report knowledge of conduct “not otherwise protected as a 
confidence.”144  The Rules define “confidence” as “information protected by the lawyer-
client privilege under applicable law.”145  
 The extent of the privilege exception is where Illinois Rule 8.3 and Model Rule 
8.3 are significantly different.  Model Rule 8.3 does not require the disclosure of 
information protected by the duty of confidentiality to the lawyer’s client.146  This duty of 
confidentiality, defined by Model Rule 1.6, includes a broad category of unprivileged 
client information.147  Indeed, in analyzing Himmel under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct – which contain the ABA’s broader exception language – one 
author argues that the outcome would have been different.148  In Himmel, the court 
analyzed the privilege issue under Rule 8.3’s predecessor, Disciplinary Rule 1-103(a).149  
That rule required the reporting by an attorney possessing “unprivileged” knowledge.150  
Although the facts of the case confined the court’s analysis to attorney-client privilege, 
the implication was that information protected by any legally recognized privilege did not 
require reporting.  The language of IRPC 8.3, however, narrowed Illinois’ already narrow 
privilege exception – recognizing the attorney-client privilege only. 
 One of the benefits of Illinois’ narrow privilege exception is that it avoids the 
tension between client confidentiality and the duty to report.   Reporting requirements in 
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other jurisdictions that contain the ABA’s broader confidentially exception cause 
commentators to wrestle with the extent to which client’s can direct their attorneys not to 
report another attorney’s misconduct.151  In Illinois, the analysis is much simpler: If the 
source of an attorney’s knowledge falls outside the attorney-client privilege, then the 
exception does not apply. 
 As a final note to privilege, Illinois attorneys should recognize that information 
obtained during a formal proceeding before the Lawyers’ Assistance Program does not 
trigger their reporting requirement.  Rule 1.6(e) directs participating attorneys to treat 
information from the attorney before the panel as if the information came from a client – 
which invokes the attorney-client privilege exception and shields the information from 
being reported under IRPC 8.3.152 
 Attorneys in firms, however, should note that this extension of the attorney-client 
privilege extends only to formal intervention programs.  According to Gunnarsson, the 
ARDC’s position is different regarding casual intra-firm communications: “[A] lawyer’s 
communication of her own reportable misconduct to another lawyer in her firm is not 
protected by attorney-client privilege, even though she may have been seeking legal 
advice.”153   
 The implications of this position are important.  Not only do newer associates face 
the prospect of having to report the conduct of senior associates and partners, but they 
may inadvertently obtain information from their fellow associates that trigger their 
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reporting duty.  As a practical matter, therefore, newer associates should disclose this 
potential conflict upfront to their advice-seeking peers.  They should then suggest 
alternative ways the colleague can obtain advice.  First, the firm may have in place 
internal reporting channels designed to resolve these situations.  Second, the colleague 
might seek advice through one of the resources discussed in Part IV below.  Finally, in 
some situations, the colleague may be forced to hire an attorney.  Although this last 
option appears extreme, any information the hired attorney obtained would be covered by 
the attorney-client privilege.  That attorney, therefore, could advise candidly without 
potentially violating the duty to report.       
D.  To Whom Should an Attorney Report? 
 The text of IRPC 8.3(a) directs attorneys to report violations “to a tribunal or 
other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.”154  This language is 
chalked full of ambiguity, exposing it to multiple interpretations.  On the one hand, “the 
tribunal” could mean the Illinois Supreme Court, and “other authority empowered to 
investigate” could mean the ARDC.  On the other hand, if the drafters meant the ARDC, 
then they simply would have written the Commission into the text of the rule.  The broad 
language, therefore, could be interpreted to allow attorneys to report violations arising out 
of current litigation to the trial judge presiding over the matter. 
 Fortunately, this is one of the few areas of IRPC 8.3(a) for which the Illinois 
Supreme Court has issued a clear answer.  In Skolnick, the court expressly stated that 
attorneys discharge their duty to report only after alerting the ARDC.155  One 
commentator notes that the court’s interpretation of the text is likely accurate given the 
                                                 
154 IRPC 8.3(a) 
155 191 Ill. 2d at 229.  
 30
history of IRPC 8.3(a).156  The language of the rule, identifying to whom an attorney 
should report, was taken primarily from the old Illinois Code – which was written before 
the ARDC officially existed.157 
 Associates in firms should note the practical considerations of this requirement.  
The duty to report is not satisfied simply by bringing misconduct to the attention of a 
partner.  In Jacobson, for example, Jacobson had not technically complied with his duty 
to report – despite his repeated insistence to several partners that the firm cease its 
improper conduct.  Also, the duty to report is not satisfied simply by bringing misconduct 
arising out of litigation to the knowledge of the trial judge.  This does not mean, however, 
that the trial judge should not be notified in these circumstances.  There is nothing in 
IRPC 8.3 preventing attorneys from reporting information to whomever they want – 
provided, of course, that information is not confidential or otherwise protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.  What it does mean, is that attorneys should recognize that even 
after reporting their opponent’s misconduct to the judge, they should not assume the 
judge will handle the proper disciplinary action.  The rule requires attorneys to take that 
additional step themselves.    
E.   When Should an Attorney Not Report? 
 As stated above, there is nothing in IRPC 8.3(a) that prevents attorneys from 
reporting the misconduct of their peers.  The Rule is meant only to mandate when 
attorneys must report.  The above advice, therefore, is based on the practical restrictions 
that that provide an incentive for attorneys to (i) identify misconduct they must report and 
(ii) report that misconduct alone. 
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 There are certain situations, however, where attorneys might be tempted to use the 
reporting requirement as a weapon in their advocacy arsenal.  As one author notes, “[A] 
small minority of lawyers use [reporting requirements] as a sword – reporting others with 
whom they clearly have a personality conflict . . . or to gain advantage in a case.”158  This 
view is shared by Kate Toomey, Deputy Counsel of the Utah State Bar’s Office of 
Professional Conduct.  She explains that reporting requirements provide an “ostensible 
cloak of ‘duty’ for . . . tattletales, reporting easily remedied transgressions and insults 
from opposing counsel, or attempting to use a Bar complaint as leverage for 
settlement.”159  
 Regarding the first point, attorneys should recognize that ARDC is not the proper 
forum for resolving personal disputes with other professionals.  With over 6,000 
investigations filed against attorneys each year to address, the ARDC has neither the time 
nor the resources to handle personal feuds.160  Deputy Administrator Grogan further 
explains that “you must have a good faith basis for bringing a matter to ARDC’s 
attention.”161 
 Regarding the second point, attorneys should consult IRPC 1.2(e).  According to 
the text of that rule, it is misconduct for an attorney to file an ARDC complaint, or even 
threaten to file an ARDC complaint, as a way of gaining leverage in a civil manner.162  
This rule was not added to the IRPC until after Himmel, yet Robinson notes that violating 
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the principle it represents is likely the real reason Himmel received such a harsh 
sanction.163  For one, the court felt that Himmel negotiated away his duty to report in 
exchange for increased monetary compensation for both his client and himself.164  
Second, in representing himself before the court, Himmel further hurt his cause by 
convincing the court – perhaps inadvertently – that he used the threat of reporting as a 
bargaining tactic to gain additional leverage over his client’s former attorney.165  As a 
practical matter, therefore, attorneys should avoid using the duty to report to either 
promote their personal agendas or gain the upper hand in an adversary proceeding.  
 While the above responses to the questions arising out of IRPC 8.3(a)’s language 
are far from concrete, they do highlight the key issues surrounding each requirement.  
Specific instances, however, are bound to fall in one IRPC 8.3’s many grey areas.  For 
guidance in these situations, attorneys should take advantage of other resources.    
IV. UTILIZING RESOURCES FOR MAKING JUDGMENT CALLS  
 As the sections above demonstrate, knowing whether the duty to report applies to 
a given situation is not always clear, and requires attorneys to use their professional 
judgment.  This proves difficult, however, for newer attorneys who have not yet acquired 
the necessary cache of practical experience.  For these attorneys, guidance through the 
duty’s specific application lies in the advice of others. 
 As an initial caveat, attorneys should use caution when discussing potential 
misconduct with their peers.  This advice cuts against statements in the IRPC’s preamble 
that expressly encourage attorneys to “discuss particularly difficult issues with their 
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peers” in an effort to reach “correct ethical decisions.”166  According to Administrator 
Grogan, however, the ARDC’s position is that a lawyers’ communication of their own 
misconduct with peers in their firm is not protected by the attorney-client privilege – even 
if the purpose of the communication is to discuss the issue and seek advice.167  The 
practical effect of the ARDC’s stance broadens the application of IRPC 8.3.  Attorneys 
who approach their peers for advice and disclose potential misconduct that either they or 
the partner they are working with engaged in, may trigger the listening attorneys’ duty to 
report.  Associates should use caution, therefore, when either seeking advice or listening 
to other young associates seeking advice.  The best approach is to alert the inquiring 
attorney that any improper conduct disclosed may trigger IRPC 8.3, and direct the 
attorney to the resources discussed below. 
 In an article published in the Chicago Bar Association Record, John Levin, a 
member of the publication’s editorial board, discussed available approaches for attorneys 
seeking advice about complying with the IRPC.168  First, attorneys can use the 
Professional Responsibility Committee of the Chicago Bar Association.169  The CBA 
uses a clever technique to provide advice without triggering the advisor’s duty to report:  
Its staff members are not lawyers.170  When inquiring attorneys call to obtain advice, they 
communicate only with staff members.171  Since the staff members are not lawyers, Rule 
8.3(a) does not apply to them.172   
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 After communicating with the attorney, the CBA’s staff member deletes any 
identifying personal or firm information and sends the inquiry to the Professional 
Responsibility Committee.173  This Committee then analyzes the request and issues an 
informal opinion.174  The entire process, from initial inquiry to receipt of opinion, 
generally takes about a week.175 
 An alternative program is the ARDC Ethics Inquiry Program.  This program’s 
goal is to “help lawyers understand their professional obligations and assist the in 
resolving important issues in their practice.”176  Run by ARDC attorneys and paralegals, 
the Program allows attorneys to call in and seek assistance resolving ethical dilemmas.  
This Program avoids triggering IRPC 8.3 by requiring attorneys to present all inquiries in 
the form of a hypothetical.  Also, the attorney’s call is not admissible in any subsequent 
disciplinary proceeding before the ARDC.177  An advantage to inquiring with the 
Program is that the attorney generally receives a response within the same day.178 
 Finally, attorneys should note that any advice rendered through programs 
established by either the CBA the ARDC – or any other Bar Organization for that matter 
– is only advisory.  The opinions, and the advice they contain, are not binding on the 
ARDC or the Illinois Supreme Court.179  So while these programs may provide newer 
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associates with additional guidance, the attorneys themselves remain responsible for 
making their own final judgments.180           
CONCLUSION 
 In almost every jurisdiction, attorneys have an ethical obligation to report the 
misconduct of their peers.  The State of Illinois, however, is unique because of the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s strict application of IRPC 8.3(a).  By understanding the history and 
purpose of the duty to report, educating themselves on the rule’s various requirements, 
taking advantage of available resources, and remembering to apply their own common 
sense, Illinois attorneys can fulfill their ethical obligation without violating the trust of 
their employers, their peers, and the public in general.     
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